Clinical and Care Bioethics Committees at Public and Private Healthcare Institutions of Medium and High Complexity Levels in Cities of the Atlantic Coast of Colombia Comitês de Bioética clínico-assistencial nas instituições de saúde públicas e privadas dos níveis de média e alta complexidade das cidades da Costa Atlântica da Colômbia Care bioethics committees are interdisciplinary groups engaged in providing education to members of said committees, all the staff in the hospital —including professors and students in their internship—, and members (...) of the community. The objective of this study is to determine the situation of clinical and care bioethics committees at healthcare institutions in the Atlantic Coast of Colombia between 2010-2016. The study is cross-sectional, descriptive, and retro-prospective. Twenty-six health institutions that met the inclusion criteria were selected and administered a semi-structured survey. The statistical software SPSS version 22 was used to analyze the information. This study adhered to ethical research guidelines. The name most commonly given to committees is Hospital Ethics Committee. Only half have staff trained in ethics or bioethics and the most outstanding function is education in ethics; however, in the same percentage there are committees whose opinion is divided as their operation is unclear. Committees should follow existing ethical and bioethical models, and bills should be brought forward to help committees at healthcare institutions become more effective as regards their structure and operation. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Carrillo González S, Lorduy-Gómez J, Muñoz-Baldiris R. Comités de Bioética Clínico-Asistencial en las instituciones de salud públicas y privadas de los niveles de mediana y alta complejidad de las ciudades de la Costa Atlántica de Colombia. Pers Bioet. 2019; 23: 122-136. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2019.23.1.8 Recibido: 23/08/2018 Aceptado: 25/02/2019. (shrink)

Esse artigo tem como objetivo investigar o ensino de filosofia e sua inserção e retirada do currículo da educação ao longo da história da educação no Brasil. A pesquisa é documental e bibliográfica e tem como referência teórica o método materialista histórico e dialético. Para a discussão a história da educação utilizamos as obras de Saviani (2007), para a discussão sobre ensino de filosofia no Brasil, utilizamos as obras de Ceppas (2010), Fávero (2004), Jaime (1997), Belieri e Sforni (2012/2013). (...) A discussão sobre o Estado e as questões ligadas à educação no contexto econômico e político, foram embasadas em Marx e Engels (2001), Carnoy (1984), Deitos (2008), Bruno (2001), Prado Jr (1998) e Tonet (2005). O Ensino de Filosofia esteve presente na educação brasileira, desde a chegada dos jesuítas, voltado à formação da elite. Ao longo da história da educação no Brasil, o ensino de filosofia não se consolidou no currículo, sendo até mesmo proibido na ditadura militar. Seu retorno, pós ditadura militar, aconteceu em 2008, garantido por lei. Em 2016, com a MP 746 (Lei 13.415/2017) a obrigatoriedade foi revogada. Conclui-se, dentre outras questões, que a entrada e saída do ensino de filosofia do currículo, está ligada aos interesses governamentais, às questões econômicas e políticas, bem como às contribuições da filosofia para a formação de estudantes críticos e pensantes, e para a compreensão da realidade e da inserção em sua transformação. (shrink)

entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.

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Andrey Sequeira Cordero (a,b) y Jaime Fornaguera Trías (a,c) (a) Centro de Investigación en Neurociencias, Universidad de Costa Rica (b) … Read More →.

We examine the impact of corporate culture on environmental performance using a sample of 7199 firm-year observations over the period of 2002–2018. We find that stronger corporate culture improves environmental performance, measured by the amount of toxic chemical release (TCR). Our result is both statistically and economically significant. We also show that cultural norms of innovation, quality and teamwork as well as a technology-oriented corporate culture have a greater impact on enhancing environmental performance. Further analyses show that managerial competence and (...) strong institutional ownership moderate the relationship between corporate culture and environmental performance. We introduce the decomposition of expected and unexpected components of TCR and document that firms with a strong corporate culture implement strategies to reduce the unexpected component of TCR in addition to the expected component of TCR. Finally, we document that strong corporate culture and environmental performance improve firms’ financial performance. Our results are robust to several sensitivity tests and procedures to mitigate endogeneity and self-selection problems. From a practical point of view, our findings suggest that a firm’s culture can determine its environmental sustainability and ethical practices. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to study some aspects of the Medieval Latin reception of Aristotle’s theory of pleasure. First, I introduce Aristotle’s position, with special attention to the problem of the ontological status of pleasure and the relationship between pleasure and the different genera of causes, as well as the somehow ambiguous exegesis of Michael of Ephesus. Second, I take into account the interpretation given by Albert the Great in his first commentary on the Ethics. Finally, I present (...) some theological issues raised by Albert’s interpretation, in the discussions about beatific vision. The authors taken in account are James of Viterbo, Radulphus Brito, Peter Auriol and William of Ockham. (shrink)

Na obra o autor consegue reforçar a ideia de que o desenvolvimento do pensamento de Lukács ocorre a partir dos acontecimentos históricos-sociais em que vive e é por isso que no início, quando jovem, seus escritos são caracterizados como idealistas e, mais tarde, com seu amadurecimento intelectual, se tornam mais materialistas. Inclusive foi esse mesmo processo histórico-social que acarretou em penalizações a sua dialética. José Paulo Netto escreve o texto de Apresentação do livro e diz o seguinte: “à concepção de (...) dialética e de totalidade de Lukács sempre faltaram [...] suportes históricos (sócio-materiais) para que a categoria de mediação fosse plenamente saturada de concreção, o que vulnerabilizou [...] a própria categoria de totalidade concreta” (p. 21). (shrink)

Existem muitas teorias sobre democracia. Na verdade, enquanto se fala de “teoria democrática” como se existisse um consenso acerca do que esta poderia significar, a partir do momento em que nos debruçamos sobre diferentes autores, apercebemo-nos de que há tantas teorias quanto há perspectivas sobre o tema. Neste artigo tenho como interlocutores Robert Dahl, Benjamin Barber, Robert Goodin e David Plotke. O artigo tem três momentos. No primeiro, desenho o contexto geral para uma reflexão crítica sobre democracia, partindo da análise (...) dos seus conceitos constitutivos, nomeadamente, os conceitos de representação, participação e deliberação. Este é o momento “estrutural”. De seguida, apoiando-me nos critérios ou virtudes de Dahl e no conceito de “democracia forte” de Barber, defendo que a instanciação dos vários modelos democráticos depende da importância que se confere a cada um dos critérios. Este é o momento de conteúdo. Dialogando com estes autores procuro identificar as implicações dos modelos representativo, participativo e deliberativo. Por último, procuro uma forma de redefinição da democracia mais positiva para o futuro, tendo o orçamento participativo como prática exemplar a seguir. (shrink)

It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...) ‘how to accept a conditional?’ has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers, they do have precise acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models of conditionals do not provide acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One of the main goals of this essay is to provide a comprehensive account of the notion of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration. First we propose an account of the basic idea of epistemic conditionality, by studying the conditionals validated by epistemic models where iteration is permitted but not constrained by special axioms. Our modeling does not presuppose that epistemic states should be represented by belief sets (we only assume that to each epistemic state corresponds an associated belief state). A full encoding of the basic epistemic conditionals (encompassing all forms of iteration) is presented and a representation result is proved. In the second part of the essay we argue that the notion of change involved in the evaluation of conditionals is suppositional, and that such notion should be distinguished from the notion of updating (modelled by AGM and other methods). We conclude by considering how some of the recent modellings of iterated change fare as methods for iterated supposing. (shrink)

Let L be a language containing the modal operator B - for full belief. An information model is a set E of stable L-theories. A sentence is valid if it is accepted in all theories of every model.

Consider a rational agent X at certain point of time t. X's epistemic state can be represented in different ways.

The paper focuses on extending to the first order case the semantical program for modalities first introduced by Dana Scott and Richard Montague. We focus on the study of neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer in the first part of the paper a series of new completeness results for salient classical systems of first order modal logic. Among other results we show that it is possible to prove strong completeness results for normal systems without the Barcan Formula (like (...) FOL + K)in terms of neighborhood frames with constant domains. The first order models we present permit the study of many epistemic modalities recently proposed in computer science as well as the development of adequate models for monadic operators of high probability. Models of this type are either difficult of impossible to build in terms of relational Kripkean semantics [40].We conclude by introducing general first order neighborhood frames with constant domains and we offer a general completeness result for the entire family of classical first order modal systems in terms of them, circumventing some well-known problems of propositional and first order neighborhood semantics (mainly the fact that many classical modal logics are incomplete with respect to an unmodified version of either neighborhood or relational frames). We argue that the semantical program that thus arises offers the first complete semantic unification of the family of classical first order modal logics. (shrink)

This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...) of choice, and in a very recent article [BS07] Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura develop Sen's proposal, offering an extension of the classical theory of choice that is capable of dealing with social norms. The first part of this article offers an alternative functional characterization of the extended notion of rationality employed by Bossert and Suzumura in [BS07]. This characterization, unlike the one offered in [BS07], represents a norm-sensitive notion of rationality in terms of a pure functional constraint unmediated by a notion of revealed preference (something that is crucial for the application developed in the second part of this article). This functional characterization is formulated for general domains (as is Bossert and Suzumura's characterization) and is therefore empirically more applicable than usual characterizations of rationality. Interestingly, the functional constraint we propose is a variant of a condition first entertained in [AGM85] by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson in the area of belief change. The second part of this article applies the theory developed in the first part to the realm of belief change. We first point out that social norms can be invoked to concoct counterexamples against some postulates of belief change (like postulate (*7)) that are necessary for belief change to be relational. These examples constitute the epistemological counterpart of Sen's counterexamples against condition α in rational choice (as a matter of fact, Rott has showed in [Rot01] that condition and postulate (*7) are mutually mappable). These examples are variants of examples Rott has recently presented in [Rot04]. One of our main goals in this article consists in applying the theory developed in the first part to develop a theory of norm-inclusive belief change that circumvents the counterexamples. We offer a new axiomatization for belief change and we furnish correspondence results relating constraints of rational choice to postulates of belief change. (shrink)

Le Glossaire du latin philosophique est un fichier d'environ 230.000 à 260.000 fiches consacré au vocabulaire philosophique du moyen âge. Une équipe du CNRS, au départ sous la direction de Pierre Michaud-Quantin, y a travaillé durant de nombreuses années. Récemment, il a été transporté de la Sorbonne à l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes, où il est désormais consultable à la Section latine. À l'occasion de l'arrivée du Glossaire du latin philosophique à l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes (...) et pour marquer un nouveau départ, une journée d'étude consacrée à ce fi chier a eu lieu à l'IRHT, le jeudi 15 mai 2008, sous le titre "Les innovations du vocabulaire latin à la fin du moyen âge:autour du Glossaire du latin philosophique." -- P. [4} of cover. (shrink)

Gerd Gigerenzer and Thomas Sturm have recently proposed a modest form of what they describe as a normative, ecological and limited naturalism. The basic move in their argument is to infer that certain heuristics we tend to use should be used in the right ecological setting. To address this argument, we first consider the case of a concrete heuristic called Take the Best (TTB). There are at least two variants of the heuristic which we study by making explicit the choice (...) functions they induce, extending these variants of TTB beyond binary choice. We argue that the naturalistic argument can be applied to only one of the two variants of the heuristic; we also argue that the argument for the extension requires paying attention to other “rational” virtues of heuristics aside from efficacy, speed, and frugality. This notwithstanding, we show that there is a way of extending the right variant of TTB to obtain a very well behaved heuristic that could be used to offer a stronger case for the naturalistic argument (in the sense that if this heuristic is used, it is also a heuristic that we should use). The second part of the article considers attempts to extending the naturalistic argument from algorithms dealing with inference to heuristics dealing with choice. Our focus is the so-called Priority Heuristic, which we extend from risk to uncertainty. In this setting, the naturalist argument seems more difficult to formulate, if it remains feasible at all. Normativity seems in this case extrinsic to the heuristic, whose main virtue seems to be its ability to describe actual patterns of choice. But it seems that a new version of the naturalistic argument used with partial success in the case of inference is unavailable to solve the normative problem of whether we should exhibit the patterns of choice that we actually display. (shrink)

Following the pioneer work of Bruno De Finetti [12], conditional probability spaces (allowing for conditioning with events of measure zero) have been studied since (at least) the 1950's. Perhaps the most salient axiomatizations are Karl Popper's in [31], and Alfred Renyi's in [33]. Nonstandard probability spaces [34] are a well know alternative to this approach. Vann McGee proposed in [30] a result relating both approaches by showing that the standard values of infinitesimal probability functions are representable as Popper functions, and (...) that every Popper function is representable in terms of the standard real values of some infinitesimal measure. Our main goal in this article is to study the constraints on (qualitative and probabilistic) change imposed by an extended version of McGee's result. We focus on an extension capable of allowing for iterated changes of view. Such extension, we argue, seems to be needed in almost all considered applications. Since most of the available axiomatizations stipulate (definitionally) important constraints on iterated change, we propose a non-questionbegging framework, Iterative Probability Systems (IPS) and we show that every Popper function can be regarded as a Bayesian IPS. A generalized version of McGee's result is then proved and several of its consequences considered. In particular we note that our proof requires the imposition of Cumulativity, i.e. the principle that a proposition that is accepted at any stage of an iterative process of acceptance will continue to be accepted at any later stage. The plausibility and range of applicability of Cumulativity is then studied. In particular we appeal to a method for defining belief from conditional probability (first proposed in [42] and then slightly modified in [6] and [3]) in order to characterize the notion of qualitative change induced by Cumulative models of probability kinematics. The resulting cumulative notion is then compared with existing axiomatizations of belief change and probabilistic supposition. We also consider applications in the probabilistic accounts of conditionals [1] and [30]. (shrink)

We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure prominently among the basic intuitions in (...) the works of, among others, Quine and Ullian (1978), Levi (1980, 1991), Harman (1988) and Gärdenfors (1988), formal accounts of belief change (AGM, KM – see Gärdenfors (1988); Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991)) have abandoned both principles (see Rott (2000)). We argue for the principles and we show how to construct a contraction operation, which obeys both. An axiom system is proposed. We also prove that the decision-theoretic notion of contraction can be completely characterized in terms of the given axioms. Proving this type of completeness result is a well-known open problem in the field, whose solution requires employing both decision-theoretical techniques and logical methods recently used in belief change. (shrink)

A LAUDATO SI: UM NOVO, NECESSÁRIO E APROFUNDADO OLHAR SOBRE A CRISE SOCIOAMBIENTAL NA SOCIEDADE CONTEMPORÂNEA.

COSTA, Alexandre da. Fundamentos da bioética: estudo sobre o pensamento de Hugo Tristram Engelhardt Jr. FERREIRA, Amauri Carlos. O imaginário religioso e modos de vida urbana: experiência e memória da Juventude Católica em Belo Horizonte – MG, anos 80. GONÇALVES, Davidson Sepini. O Panóptico de Jeremy Bentham: por uma leitura utilitarista. GÓIS, Aurino José. Parque Municipal de Belo Horizonte: público, apropriações e significados. FARIA, Paulo Antônio Couto. Teologia no limiar da filosofia: a modernidade e o encontro fé e razão (...) na obra de Henrique Cláudio de Lima Vaz. (shrink)

We propose a formalization of Meinong's theory of objects with the help of Hilbert's $\epsilon$-symbol and a paraconsistent logical system, with an eye towards its application in an axiomatization of the natural sciences.

No presente trabalho apresentamos e traduzimos o texto “O Perigo da confirmação não-empírica", de Carlo Rovelli, cosmólogo italiano, um dos proponentes da gravitação quântica em loop. Trata-se do texto apresentado por Rovelli em 2015 durante o chamado “Debate de Munich” sobre o problema da base empírica do método científico. Rovelli analisa – e se contrapõe – à proposta do filósofo da ciência Richard Dawid, que em String Theory and the Scientific Method, defende que teorias científicas podem ser avaliadas, aceitas e (...) defendidas a partir de critérios não-empíricos. Rovelli, a despeito de concordar com Dawid quanto a importância histórica dos argumentos não-empíricos no desenvolvimento de teorias físicas, sustenta que a confirmação empírica deve permanecer sendo considerada indispensável para a prática científica e o sucesso cumulativo da ciência. (shrink)